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law action of deceit. This, too, would have required numerous suits
because the defendants were from different states.. 9
In conclusion, it seems that in the securities field strong but gen-
eral regulations against fraud are a necessity. The judiciary must
continue to construe the provisions of X-ioB-5 broadly, as was done
in Hooper.40 The alternative is to enact more complex fraud sections
into both acts. Judging from the history of common law fraud and
deceit, as it applied to securities transactions, this result seems unde-
sirable. Allowing more discretion in the courts and the SEC to combat
technicalities presented by the swindler, as does the general wording
of X-ioB-5 , appears to be the most satisfactory method to guard against
future fraud in the purchase or sale of securities.
KENNF.rH 0. HUNTINCDON, JR.
SHIPPING ACT: CONTRACT VS. COMMON CARRIAGE
In Grace Line, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Bd.,' the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit upheld an order by the Federal Maritime
Board2 that a common carrier by water cannot be at the same time,
as to one commodity, a contract carrier within the meaning of the
1916 Shipping Act.3
3In Hooper, the trustee in bankruptcy was a citizen of Alabama. Cage, the
originator of the fraudulent scheme, was a Texas resident who was presently in
South America and was a fugitive from Texas justice. Mountain States Securities
Corporation was incorporated in Colorado, the stock transfer agent was in New
York City and another of the defendants lived in Pennsylvania.
'°Query: Would the court have reached the same result if the defrauded cor-
poration had not been in bankruptcy? If the corporation had continued as a going
concern, could the rights of the original shareholders have been preserved by any
method other than rescinding or nullifying the fraudulent issuance of an additional
7oo,ooo shares of stock?
2280 F.ad 79o (2d Cir. 196o).
2The Federal Maritime Board is the agency of the Department of Commerce
which is presently vested wfth the power to enforce the regulations issued under the
authority of the Shipping Act of 1916. The Act of 1916 created the United States
Shipping Board. The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 established the United States
Maritime Commission and gave it the duties of the old Shipping Board. Finally,
the Maritime Commission was abolished by Reorganization Plan 21, 64 Stat.
1273 (195o), which created the Federal Maritime Board. Morse, A Study of
American Merchant Marine Legislation, 25 Law & Contemp. Prob. 57 (1960); 64
Yale L.J 569 (1955)-
3The power of Congress to adopt regulations concerning maritime subjects
is derived both from the Admiralty and Maritime jurisdiction of the federal judi-
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The principal case grew out of complaints filed with the Board by
two shippers, 4 who alleged that Grace Line was violating sections
812 (fourth) and 815 (first) of the Shipping Act 5 by unjustly discrimi-
nating against them as to cargo space. The plaintiff is the only United
States flag operator6 offering common carrier service7 on a route8
between ports on the Pacific coast of South America and the United
States Atlantic coast.9 In 1934 Grace Line installed on its ships' ° ex-
pensive refrigeration compartments, called "reefers," for the carriage
of bananas from Guayaquil, Ecuador to New York."' From the be-
ginning of its banana carriage, Grace Line offered its limited "reefer"
space on a contract carriage basis only to no more than three shippers
at a time.' 2 Grace Line contended that it was not a common carrier
ciary and the Interstate and FOreign Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution.
The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398, 404 (1907).
It would appear that the federal authority used for the justification of the
Shipping Act of 1916 is the narrower Foreign and Interstate Commerce Power.
Robinson, Admiralty § 67 (1939); 48 Am. Jur. Shipping §§ 3-8 (1943).
4The two complainants were Banana Distributors, Inc. and one Arthur
Schwartz. Five parties intervened in the proceeding before the Board, two of whom
favored the complainants' position. It also appeared that 31 other persons had
been refused banana carriage space in the past. Schwartz had been offered
"reefer" space on Grace Line's fortnightly cargo vessels, which Ie refused. Grace
Line, Inc. v. FMB 28o F.2d 790, 793-94 (2d Cir. i96o); Banana Distributors, Inc.
v. Grace Line, Inc., 5 F.M.B. 615 (1959) (supplemental report and order of the
Board); Banana Distributors, Inc. v. Grace Line, Inc., 5 F.M.B. 278 ('957)-
sUnited States Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 812(fourth), 815(first) 1958. "Under
section 14 Fourth a common carrier by water may not unjustly discriminate
against any shipper in the matter of cargo space accommodations or other facilities,
and under 16 First such carrier may not give any undue or unreasonable preference
to any particular person or subject any particular person to any undue or unreason-
able prejudice or disadvantage." 5 F.M.B. at 624; see also Robinson, Admiralty § 67
(1939)- Complainants also alleged a violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. However, this allegation was subsequently dropped. 5 F.M.B. at 6M6.
OGrace Line receives operating-differential subsidy aid. 5 F.M.B. at 280 and 617.
7Grace Line carries over 15o items of general cargo as a common carrier. This
may indicate that its desire to carry only one item-bananas-on a contract basis
is made in good faith. However, Grace Line does carry certain Chilean fruit as a
common carrier. 5 F.M.B. at 617-19.
sTrade Route No. 2. Id. at 617.
OUnited Fruit Co. and Standard Fruit Co. have ships engaged on this route,
but they carry bananas as an "exclusive proprietary cargo." Grancolombiana Line
and Chilean Line, both foreign-flag operators, have "reefer" space vessels in this
trade, but because of destinations and infrequent or irregnlar service, they are not
considered satisfactory banana carriers. Id. at 618.
1 0Grace Line operates on this route three freighters with approximately
fortnightly sailings and six combination passenger-cargo vessels with weekly sailings,
all of which have banana "reefer" facilities. Id. at 617-18.
na8o F.2d at 791.
"Ibid. See also 5 F.M.B. at 618. It is interesting to note that Grace Line has
consistently limited its banana contracts to three. This is the magic number of
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of bananas as it had never held itself out as such-always carrying
bananas on a contract basis;' 3 and hence, it had not violated the Act.
14
Also, Grace Line felt that bananas are a "specialty" not capable of
common carriage' 5 because they are an unusual fruit that ripen rap-
idly' 6 and require careful handling, speedy transportation and, above
all, coordination in growing, shipping and marketing to bring them
to the consumer.' 7 Upon a hearing of the dispute the Board decided
that because bananas are "susceptible" of common carriage,' 8 Grace
Line was a common carrier of the product and had thus violated the
Act. It then ordered Grace Line to cancel its old contracts and offer
space to complainants and others on two-year forward-booking arrange-
ments.'9 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the
Board.20 It felt that the "susceptibility test" was erroneous as it would
eliminate almost all contract carriage.2' The Board reconsidered the
case on remand and without further hearing reached the same con-
clusion as before.
22
On a second appeal to the Second Circuit, the court speaking
through Learned Hand, affirmed the Board's holding.23 In a brief
permissive contracts allowed a contract carrier under the so-called "number of
contracts" factor for determining contract or common carriage. Mich. Pub. Util.
Comm'n v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570 (1925); 43 Cornell L.Q. 96 (1957); 36 Mich. L. Rev.
802 0938); 91 U. Pa. L. Rev. 481 (1943). See note 29 infra.
212 8 o F.2d at 791; 5 F.M.B. at 617, 61g.
"'The court stated that "sections [8S2(fourth) and 8i5(first)] gave the Board
no jurisdiction to regulate its banana business." 28o F.2d at 791-92. Here it appears
there is confusion between a jurisdictional question and a legal question. Grace
Line is not contending that the Board hasno power to hear the case, but some
other agency has such power-a jurisdictional argument; but Grace contends it has
committed no wrong under the Act and hence there is no cause of action-a legal
argument.
r5 F.M.B. at 620.
1028o F.2d at 795-96.
""Growing, shipping and marketing of bananas, due to the nature of the
commodity itself, requires a carefully synchronized operation." 5 F.M.B. at 618.
The situation is made more difficult because there are no shoreside refrigerated
warehouses in Guayaquil, and the loading operation must be performed offshore
by barge. As temperature control is important in route, and as each shipper has
his own views as to the correct temperature for his fruit, Grace Line argued that
the required individual attention indicated the need for contract carriage in
this field. 5 F.M.B. at 618.
295 F.M.B. at 283.
Id. at 287-88. The case was first heard by an examiner who found that Grace
Line was a common carrier of bananas and recommended the two-year forward-
booking arrangements. 5 F.M.B. at 282 and 616.
2nGrace Line, Inc. v. FMB, 263 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1959).
Ild. at 711.
--25 F.M.B. 615 (1959).
uGrace Line, Inc. v. FMB, 280 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 196o).
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opinion Judge Hand conceded that at common law the holding out
test of common carriage was used. He also felt that at common law
a carrier could be both a common and a contract carrier. Indeed,
Judge Hand admitted, at least by implication, that at common law
Grace Line could have carried bananas on a contract basis; however, he
felt that the Shipping Act had changed the common law. It was held
that under the Shipping Act a common carrier by water is precluded
from carrying particular items as a contract carrier on the same ship.
Grace Line, an admitted common carrier by water within the Act,
could not carry bananas on a contract basis even though it had never
held itself out to the public as a banana carrier. Carrying bananas on
a contractual basis constitutes an undue preference and unjust discrim-
ination under the Act. In other words, once a common carrier-always
a common carrier. Judge Hand's reasoning was based upon his inter-
pretation of the intention, purpose and language of the Act. Judge
Moore, writing a persuasive dissent, indicated that he would have re-
versed the Board on both the law and facts of the case.24
At common law a common carrier of goods is defined as one who
holds himself out indifferently25 to the general public as being en-
gaged in the business of transporting goods from place to place for
hire.26 Ships holding themselves out to carry goods for all persons in-
differently are called common carriers by water.27 A contract or private
carrier is one who transports for certain shippers on a private con-
tract basis and who does not make a public profession that he will
carry for all who apply for carriage.28 The primary test of a common
-'Id. at 793-99.
"l'Indiflerently" means in this context without discrimination among or prefer-
ence to members of the general public, i.e., offering to treat all shippers similarly
situated equally. See note 26 infra.
m'The Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 7 (1858); Georgia Life
Ins. Co. v. Easter, 189 Ala. 472, 66 So. 514 (1914); Rathbun v. Ocean Acc. &-
Guar. Corp., 299 111. 562, 132 N.E. 754 (1921); Carlton v. Boudar, 118 Va. 52t, 88
S.E. 174 (1916); Cushing v. White, ioi Wash. 172, 172 Pac. 229 (1918); 43 Cornell
L.Q. 96 (1957); 36 Mich L. Rev. 8o2 (1938). See also 48 Am. Jur. Shipping § 373
(1943); 9 Am. Jur. Carriers §§ 1, 4, 14 (1937); Black, Law Dictionary 269 (4th ed.
1951).
2Liverpool & G.W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397 (1889); The
Lady Pike, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 1 (1874); The Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U . (21
How.) 7 (1858); Alexander Eccles & Co. v. Strachan Shipping Co., 21 F.2d 653 (S.D.
Ga. 1924); Boon & Co. v. Steamboat Belfast, 4o Ala. 184 (1886); Hale v. New Jersey
Steam Nay. Co., 15 Conn. 539 (1843); Robinson, Admiralty § 67 (1939). See also 48
Am. Jur. Shipping § 373 (1943). A common carrier by water is frequently called
a general ship.
sRathbun v. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp., 299 I1. 562, 123 N.E. 754 (1921);
McGregor v. Gill, 114 Tenn. 521, 86 S.W. 318 (1905); Cushing v. White, 1o
Wash. 172, 172 Pac. 229 (1918); Cannon, What Constitutes a Common Carrier?, 15
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carrier is the "holding out" to the public to carry indifferently.2 9
A common carrier was not liable as such at common law as to items
it never "commonly" held itself out to carry. This is shown by Citi-
zens' Bank v. Nantucket Steamboal' Co.30 decided by Mr. Justice Story
in 1811, wherein the plaintiff had entrusted to the master of defend-
ant's ship a large sum of bank bills for transportation. Mr. Justice
Story affirmed the lower court's decision for the defendant by holding
that even though defendant was an admitted carrier of goods and
merchandise, it was not a common carrier of bank bills as it had
neither held itself out as a common carrier nor received compensa-
tion for bank bill carriage.31 Numerous other common law decisions
such as Georgia Life Ins. Co. v. Easter32 indicate that an undisputed
common carrier could also be a private contract carrier as to particular
items of business.33
Marq. L. Rev. 67 (1931); 43 Cornell L.Q. 96 (1957). See also Black, Law Dictionary
269 (4th ed. 1951); 9 Am. Jur. Carriers §§ 1o, 37 (1937). A contract or private carrier
by water is frequently referred to as a charter-party.
'United States v. Contract Steel Carriers, Inc., 35o U.S. 409 (1956); Michigan
Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570 (1925); Citizens' Bank v. Nantucket
S.S. Co., 5 Fed. Cas. 719 (No. 2,730) (C.C.D. Mass. 1811); Georgia Life Ins. Co.
v. Easter, 189 Ala. 472, 66 So. 514 (1914); Steele v. McTyer's Adm'r, 31 Ala. 667
(1858); Rathbun v. Ocean Ace. & Guar. Corp. 299 IR. 562, 132 N.E. 754 (1921); Lake
Shore & Mich. So. R.R. v. Perkins, 25 Mich 329 (1872); Faucher v. Wilson, 68 N.H.
338, 38 Atl. 1002 (i895); Cushing v. White, ioi Wash. 172, 172 Pac. 229 (1918).
Several factors are used in applying the "holding out" test to determine whether
a particular carrier is a contract or common carrier: (i) the number of contracts
under which the carrier operates; (2) duration of the contracts; (3) the right of
the carrier to select and reject shippers; (4) the god faith of the carrier in his
supposed "holding out"; (5) the character and nature of the business; (6) the
degree of specialization of the service and equipment used by the carrier. United
States v. Contract Steel Carriers, Inc., 350 U.S. 409 (1956); Michigan Pub. Util.
Comm'n v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570 (1925); Cushing v. White, ioi Wash. 172, 172 Pac.
229 (1918); Cannon, What Constitutes a Common Carrier?, 15 Marq. L. Rev. 67
(1931); 43 Cornell L.Q. 96 (1957); 36 Mich. L. Rev. 802 (1938); 91 U. Pa. L. Rev. 481
(1943). Recently, the problem of common versus contract carriage has come up
frequently in the motor transportation industry.
m5 Fed. Cas. 719 (No. 2,730) (C.C.D. Mass. 1811).
-"For cases similar to Citizens' Bank, see Knox v. Rives, Battle & Co., 14 Ala.
249 (1848); Farmers & Mechanics' Bank v. Champlain Transp. Co., 23 Vt. 186 (1851).
" 1 89 Ala. 472, 66 So. 514 (1914). "The mere fact that a liveryman may be en-
gaged in one line of business as a common carrier does not render him a common
carrier as to his livery business. His hack when hauling passengers from a station
may be a common carrier, and that same hack when it is carrying a traveling
man from one town to another town may not be a common carrier." 66 So. at 517.
3Baltimore &. Ohio S.W. Ry. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498 (19oo); Express Cases, 117
U.S. 1 (886); New Jersey Steam Nay. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 47 U.S. (6 How.)
344 (1847); Coup v. Wabash St. L. & P. Ry., 56 Mich. 111, 22 N.W. 215 (1885);
Lake Shore & Mich. So. R.R. v. Perkins, 25 Mich. 329 (1872). In both the Coup
and Perkins cases Michigan held that a railroad common carrier can be a contract
i96i]
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Terminal Taxicab Co., Inc. v. Kutz34 shows that the Supreme Court
of the United States has followed this view in cases of carrier regula-
tion in areas other than shipper discrimination. In that case, the
Court was presented with the problem of whether a taxicab company
which also operated a private car rental agency was completely sub-
ject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission
of the District of Columbia. Under the D. C. Public Utility Act of
1913, the Commission was allowed to exercise jurisdiction over all
common carriers as public utilities. The Court, speaking through
Justice-Holmes, held that the taxicab company was a common carrier
within the Act as to its taxi business but not as to its private garage
business which the Commission lacked jurisdiction to regulate.
How was the common law privilege allowing a common carrier
to remain a contract carrier as to specific goods affected by the Inter-
state Commerce Act and similar state legislation? The Interstate Com-
merce Act of 1887 35-now Part I, Chapter i of the Act-was passed
to regulate commerce so as to prevent undue preference and unjust
discrimination.3 6 From an early date it was held by the federal courts
carrier as to unusually difficult items of carriage: "livestock" in the Perkins case
and a "circus" in the Coup case. In the Coup case, the court expressly said
that the railroad could be a contract carrier of a circus elephant because of the
difficulties of such carriage. It is submitted that a banana to a ship is like an
elephant to a train.
'241 U.S. 252 (1916).
3Now, Interstate Commerce Act, Part I; General Provisions and Railroads and
Pipe Line Carriers, 49 US.C. § 1 (1958).
-"Texas & Pac. Ry. v. ICC, 162 U.S. 197 (1896); ICC v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.,
145 US. 263 (1892); United States v. Hanley, 71 Fed. 672 (N.D. 111. 1896); 2
Owsley, Chitwood and Nixon, A Short History of the American People 243, 405
(2d ed. 1952); 8 Encyc. Soc. Sci., Interstate Commerce Commission 229 (1935). Sec.
I of Part i of the Interstate Commerce Act does not define common carrier but
merely says it covers common carriers for hire. Both section 2 and section 30) of
Part I of the Act prevent undue preference and unjust discrimination. Section
2 appears to be 'limited to rate discrimination, while section 3(1) is sufficiently
comprehensive to cover all forms of discrimination. United States ex rel. Morris
v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 40 Fed. 101 (C.C.N.D. N.Y. 1889); 45 Yale L.J 692
(1936); 17 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 70 (1948).
The Federal Motor Carriers Act, 49 U.S.C. § 3o3(a)(14) (1958) (Interstate
Commerce Act, Part 1I) defines common carrier in common law "holding out"
test terms. United States v. Contract Steel Carriers, Inc., 350 U.S. 409 (1956); 43
Cornell L.Q. 96 (1957).
Even under the old Interstate Commerce Act, now Part I, Chapter 3, the
Interstate Commerce Commission had regulatory power over certain types of water
carriers, i.e., where water carrier regulation was necessary to the regulation of rail
carriers in a continuous carriage of commodities over rail and water. 49 U.S.C. §
l(i)(a) (1958); Robinson, Admiralty § 67 (1939); Hul, The Regulation of Water
Carriers, 66 U. Pa. L. Rev. 95 (igi8). By the Transportation Act of 194o, Interstate
Commerce Act, Part III-Vater Carriers, the regulatory powers of the ICC are
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that the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 was merely declaratory of
the common law.3 7 In addition state courts have also held that their
unjust discrimination acts, similar to the Interstate Commerce Act,
are declaratory of the common law.3s In Atlantic Exp. Co. v. Wilming-
ton & W. R.R.,39 the Supreme Court of North Carolina decided that
its Railroad Commission Act did not enlarge the duty imposed on
railroads by the common law. The Act did not require railroads to
greatly extended over water carriers to cover all such carriers in interstate and
contiguous foreign trade. Morse, A Study of American Merchant Marine Legisla-
tion, 25 Law & Contemp. Prob. 57 (1960); Comment, Regulation of Water Carriers
by the Interstate Commerce Commission, 50 Yale L.J. 654 (1940-
Part III of the Interstate Commerce Act does not apply to Grace Line in this
case because it is engaged in American foreign or non-contiguous domestic trade.
Hence, Grace Line comes under the regulations of the Federal Maritime Board
pursuant to the Shipping Act. Therefore, there is no possibility of applying § 91o
"dual operations under certificate and permit" of Part of III of the Interstate Com-
merce Act to Grace Line. Seciton 91o prevents a person with a certificate as a
common carrier from also acquiring a certificate as a contract carrier. As § 91o is
in derogation of the common law, it should be strictly construed to apply only
to the granting of certificates and not mean that a common carrier cannot also
act as a contract carrier. The intent of Congress in passing the Transportation
Act of 1940 was primarily to protect common carriers from contract carrier com-
petition, rather than to protect shippers from common carriers acting as contract
carrierq; hence, it does not appear Congress intended it to apply to a situation
such as the one in the Grace Line case. Also, § 902 of Part III of the Interstate
Commerce Act defines common carrier in common law "holding out" test terms.
This is an additional reason for holding that Congress did not intend to change
the common law as to such carriers. Neither the Shipping Act, Merchant Marine
Act of 1936, nor any other maritime act has a section similar to § go.
ICC v. Chicago, Great IV. R)., 209 US. 1o8 (i9o8); Southern Pac. Co. v.
ICC, 200 U.S. 536 (19o6); ICC v. Alabama Midland Ry., 168 U.S. 144 (1897); Texas
& Pac. Ry. v. ICC, 162 U.S. 197 (1896); ICC v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 145 U.S.
263 (189 2);Gamble-Robinson Comm'n Co. v. Chicago & N.V. Ry., 168 Fed. 161
(8th Cir. 19o9); Tift v. Southern Ry., 123 Fed. 789 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 19o3); United
States v. Hanley, 71 Fed. 672 (N.D. Ill. 1896); ICC v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 43
Fed. 37 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1890); Hilton Lumber Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 141 N.C.
171, 53 S.E. 823 (1906); Fitzgerald v. Grand Trunk R.R., 63 Vt. 169, 22 Atl. 76 (1890.
See also 9 Am. Jur. Carriers §§ 43, 208-09 (1937). The Interstate Commerce Act
is said to be a remedial act. It appears the common law also prevented unjust
discrimination and undue influence. Tift v. Southern Ry., 123 Fed. 789 (C.C.S.D.
Ga. 19o3); Cowden v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 94 Cal. 470, 29 Pac. 873-(1892); Johnson
v. Pensacola & Perdido R.R., 16 Fla. 623 (1878); Chicago & Alton R.R. v. People
ex rel. Koerner, 67 IlI. 11 (1873); Messenger v. Pennsylvania R.R., 37 N.J.L. 531
(Sup. Ct. 1874); Kline, The Origin of the Rule Against Unjust Discrimination, 66
U. Pa. L. Rev. 123 (1918).
'1Atchison, T. & S. R.R. v. Denver & New Orleans R.R., 11o U.S. 667 (1884)
(Supreme Court interpreting the Colorado Constitution); Cowden v. Pacific Coast
SS. Co., 94 Cal. 470, 29 Pac. 873 (1892); Chicago & Alton R.R. v. People ex rel.
Koerner, 67 II. 11 (1873); Hilton Lumber Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 141 N.C.
171, 53 S.E. 823 (1906); Atlantic Exp. Co. v. Wilmington & W. R.R., iii N.C.
463, 16 S.E. 393 (1892).
-sii N.C. 463, 16 S.E. 393 (1892).
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become common carriers as to express companies when they had always
handled express companies on a contract basis. That this view would
be followed in a federal court is shown by United States v. Louisville
& Nashville Ry.10 where the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
held the government liable on a private contract with a railroad for
the carriage of electrical equipment which the railroad was not re-
quired to carry as a common carrier by Commerce Commission regu-
lations. Therefore, it would certainly appear that the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887 did not change the common law right of a com-
mon carrier to transport goods for which it had made no public
offer on a contract basis.
The Shipping Act of 191641 was modeled after and had the same
purpose as the*Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.42 In numerous cases
the federal courts have 'held that the Shipping Act should be in-
terpreted in the same way as the Interstate Commerce Act and have
used railroad discrimination cases in reaching a Shipping Act decis-
ion.4 3 For example, in United States Nay. Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co.,
44
the Supreme Court of the United States said:
'221 F.2d 698 (6th Cir. 1955).
'1 Now, the United States Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. § goi (1958). The Shipping
Act's discrimination regulations are completely operative today and were not
changed or materially affected by the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. Morse, A
Study of American Merchant Marine Legislation, 25 Law 9- Contemp. Prob. 57
(1960); 25 Geo. L.J. 416 (1937). See generally Knauth, Characteristics of United
States Maritime Law, 13 Md. L. Rev. I (1953); Robinson, Admiralty § 67 (1939).
'2Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 3oo U.S. 297 (1937); United States Nay.
Co., Inc. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932); Compagnie Generale Transatlantque
v American Tobacco Co., 31 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1929) (Judge Learned Hard partici-
pated in the decision); Robinson, Admiralty §§ 67, 68 (1939); 44 Harv. L. Rev. 955
(1931); 48 Am. Jur. Shipping § 345 (1943)-
Sections 812 (fourth) and 815 (first) of the Shipping Act on discrimination are
quite similar in both the wording and obvious purpose to section 3(1) of the Inter-
state Commerce Act. Section 8oi of the Shipping Act is similiar to section i of
the Interstate Commerce Act in that both cover common carriers, but neither de-
fines the term. "The term 'common carrier' is not defined in the Act [Shipping Act],
but the legislative history of the Act indicates that the person to be regulated is the
common carrier at common law." Banana Distributors, Inc. v. Grace Line, Inc., 5
F.M.B. 615, 620 (1959).
'California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577 (1944); United States Nay. Co. v.
Cunard S.S. Co., Ltd. 284 U.S. 474 (1932); Compagnie Generale Transatlantique
v. American Tobacco Co., 31 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1929) (Judge Learned Hand partici-
pated in the decision); Shepherd & Co. v. Agwilines, Inc.,39 F. Supp. 528 (E.D.S.C.
1941); Roberto Hernandez, Inc. c. Arnold Bernstein Schiffahrtsge-Sellschaft, M. B. H.,
31 F. Supp. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 194o); McCormick SS. Co. v. United States, 16 F. Supp.
45 (N.D. Cal. 1936); Robinson, Admiralty §§ 67, 68 (1939); 44 Harv. L. Rev. 955
(1931). "It has further been held that the Shipping Act is a comprehensive measure
bearing a relation to common carriers by water substantially the same as that borne
by the Interstate Commerce Act to interstate common carriers by land, and that
the settled construction in respect of the earlier Act must be applied to the later
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"In its general scope and purpose, as well as in its terms, that
Act [the Shipping Act of 1916] closely parallels the Interstate
Commerce Act; and we cannot escape the conclusion that Con-
gress intended that the two acts, each in its own field, should
have like interpretation, application and effect. It follows that
the settled construction in respect of the earlier act must be
applied to the later one....",
It would appear that the majority's decision in Grace Line has limited
foundation in law. In reaching a decision under the Shipping Act, the
court should have consulted the Interstate Commerce Act, Part I,
Chapter i. The Act is declaratory of the common law, and as the
common law allowed a common carrier to be a contract carrier in areas
in which it had made no holding out of common carriage, it should
-be allowed the same privilege under the Shipping Act.46
The facts of the principal case present an additional reason why
Grace Line should not be held to be a common carrier of bananas.
Bananas are an unusual subject of carriage having rapid ripening and
spoiling traits and requiring speed in transportation as well as care
in handling.47 An analogy can be drawn to the Express Cases48 in
which the Supreme Court of the United States held that a railroad was
not a common carrier as to express companies it had always handled
on a contract basis. A major factor in that decision was the unusual
nature of express business which requires speed, reasonable certainty
in arrival time and careful custody.4 9 This view has been applied to
one." Shepard & Co. v. Agwvilines. Inc.. 39 F. Supp. 528, 531 (E.D.S.C. 1941). A
typical case of the application of the Shipping Act to discrimination is Roberto
Hernandez, Inc. v. Arnold Bernstein Schiffahrtsge.-Sellschaft, M.B.H., 31 F. Stipp.
76 (S.D.N.Y. i94o) , reversed in 116 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1941). The discrimination
problem has frequently come up in recent dual rate shipping contracts cases. FMB
v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958); 43 Va. L. Rev. 267 (1957): 64 Yale L.J.
569 (1955).
"284 U.S. 474 (1932). See generally i Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 153 11932).
'1284 U.S. at 481. tEmphasis added.) The quote continues. "unless, in partictlar
instances, there be something peculiar in the question tinder consideration, or
dissimiliaritv in the terms of the Act relating thereto, requiring a different con-
clusion." It is submitted there is nothing peculiar in the Grace Line question. It
was a frequent question at common law and could be under the Interstate Com-
merce Act as shown by this comment. Also, the two acts are similar as to discrimi-
nation.
'The principal case assumes and accepts the pri-ilege at common law. and it is
submitted that the court shotld have stopped at that point.
47See notes 15 and 16 supra.
4'117 U.S. 1 (1886).
""The reason is obvious why special contract- in reference to this business are
necessary. The transportation required is of a kind which must, if poqsible, be had
for the most part on passenger trains. It iequires not onl% speed, but reasonable
certaint) as to the quantity that will be carried at any one time.... As the business
i96i]
268 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVIII
other unusual items of carriage,50 and it appears should have been
followed with respect to bananas.
The futility of a decision rendering Grace Line a common carrier
of bananas can only be fully realized by viewing its application to
the facts of the company's business. First, the decision is difficult to
enforce. There appears to be no legal way to require Grace Line to
increase its facilities, either as to number of ships or banana "reefer"
compartments. 5' Also, there appears to be no legal way to prevent
Grace Line from discontinuing its banana service.5 2 Courts are usually
loath to render decisions which can be easily avoided by the de-
fendant. It would appear that the Maritime Board and the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit should have been reluctant to do
so in this case.
Second, the applicatibn of the decision clearly indicates that Grace
Line should have been held to be a contract carrier in the first in-
stance. As a: common carrier, Grace Line by definition must be pre-
pared to transport bananas in the order tendered 3 to the limit of its
limited facilities.5 4 That the Board recognized'the ensuing havoc of
common carriage here is shown by the fact that it merely rewrote
the previous contracts for the benefit of the complainants.55 The ap-
to be (lone is 'express' it implies access to the trains for loading at the latest, and
for unloading at the earliest, convenient moment. All this is entirely inconsistent
with the idea of an express business on passenger trains free to all express car-
riers." 117 U.S. at 23. This view respecting the express business has been followed in
other cases. Baltimore & Ohio S.W. Ry. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498 (1900); Atlantic Exp.
Co. v. Wilmington & W.R.R., iii N.C. 463, 16 S.E. 393 (1892). Judge Moore ap-
proved this approach in his dissenting opinion in Grace Line. 280 F.2d at 798.
'Lake Shore & Mich. So. R.R. v. Perkins, 25 Mich. 329 (1872) (livestock); Knox
v. Rives, Battle & Co., 14 Ala. 249 (1848) (money, jewels and documents).
"Ocean S.S. Co. v. Savannah Locomotive Works & Supply Co., 131 Ga. 831,
63 S.E. 577 (1909); Robinson, Admiralty § 68 ('939); 48 Am. Jur. Shipping § 378
(1943). A railroad common carrier can usually be required to increase its facilities.
Norfolk & IV. Ry. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 265 U.S. 70 (1924); 9 Am. Jur. Carriers
§ 32.5 (1943)-
52Lucking v. Detroit & Cleveland Nay. Co., 265 U.S. 346 (1924); McCormick S.S.
Co. v. United States, 16 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Cal. 1936); Robinson, Admiralty § 68
(1939); 48 Am. Jur. Shipping § 348 ('943).
"1See note 26 supra. Ocean S.S. Co. v. Savannah Locomotive Works & Supply
Co., 131 Ga. 831, 63 SXE. 577 (1909).
6128o F.2d at 796.
n5Courts in general are loath to rewrite and make new contracts for people
because such action conflicts with fundamental principles of freedom of contract.
See 280 F.2d at 793- "Clearly this cannot be afforded by keeping the contracts in
force, for both parties have agreed that they may be terminated at any time by
either party on notice; nor by making new contracts, because that is not within
the scope of judicial power." Express Cases, 117 U.S. 1, 26 (1886). It appears,
however, that a court may void a public service common carrier's contract if it
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plication logically proves Grace Line to be a contract carrier of
bananas as shown by Judge Moore in his dissent:
"The Board would solve the problem by what it terms a 'two-
year forward-booking' plan. This is in reality nothing but a
continuation of the very contract system which the Board has
declared to be illegal. If the Board's pronouncement has any
validity, namely, that contract carriage cannot exist on the
same vessel as common carriage, this principle should apply to
complainant's contracts as well as those of the present ship-
pers."56
The majority further bases its decision on the policy of recent
maritime legislation to encourage the development and maintenance
of our merchant marine.5 7 However, it appears this decision promotes
the welfare of no one. It does not help the banana shippers because of
the limited possibility of continued carriage for any shipper0 5 It does
not help Grace Line, a representative of the shipping industry, be-
cause under the decision Grace Line is a common carrier, and its
potential liability is increased by making it an insurer of a very
perishable product.5 9 The inability of Grace Line to handle its
banana carriage according to its own business judgment may cause
the service60 to be discontinued, thus taking American ships from
the sea and putting American seamen out of work. It is difficult to
see how this decision will attract more private capital into the ship-
ping business and promote our merchant marine.61 Moreover, since
conflicts with a public duty. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 81
W. Va. 457, 94 S.E. 545 (1917); 9 Am. Jur. Carriers § 42 (937). But there may be
a possible "due process" argument. Michigan Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Duke, 266 U.S.
570 (1925); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. North Carolina Corp. Comm'n, 206 U.S. 1
(1906).
0%8o F.-d at 796. "To admit, as does the Board, that Grace Line could carry
bananas on a separate ship devoted to contract carriage but could not construct
special compartments on one of its present ships for this purpose is to create an
artificial principle devoid of logic or reason." 280 F.2d at 795.
MId. at 792. The policy of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 is stated in
46 U.S.C. § 1101 (1958). See also Robinson, Admiralty § 68 (1939) (policy of mari-
time legislation); Morse, A Study of American Merchant Marine Legislation, 25
Law & Contemp. Prob. 57 (1937).
r&28o F.2d at 797. The fact that the two year forward-booking contract system
would not provide certainty as to growing and marketing times as new shippers
enter the field and thus delay the period when a former shipper's turn for a
new two year contract would arrive is recognized by the Board. 5 F.M.B. at 285 and
626.
r'The Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 7 (1858); The Lady Pike,
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 1 (874); Robinson, Admiralty § 69 (1939); 9 Am. Jur. Carriers
§§ 4, io, 661-69, 705 (1943)-
OSee notes 51 and 52 supra.
"'Additional governmental capital through subsidies might be required, thus
leading to a policy of increased socialism.
